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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to update the cybersecurity-related accounting literature by synthesizing 39
recent theoretical and empirical studies on the topic. Furthermore, the paper provides a set of categories into
which the studies fit.
Design/methodology/approach – This is a synthesis paper that summarizes the research literature on
cybersecurity, introducing knowledge from the extant research and revealing areas requiring further
examination.
Findings – This synthesis identifies a research framework that consists of the following research
themes: cybersecurity and information sharing, cybersecurity investments, internal auditing and
controls related to cybersecurity, disclosure of cybersecurity activities and security threats and security
breaches.
Practical implications – Academics, practitioners and the public would benefit from a research
framework that categorizes the research topics related to cybersecurity in the accounting field. This type of
analysis is vital to enhance the understanding of the academic research on cybersecurity and can be used to
support the identification of new lines for future research.
Originality/value – This is the first literature analysis of cybersecurity in the accounting field, and it has
significant implications for research and practice by detailing, for example, the benefits of and obstacles to
information sharing. This synthesis also highlights the importance of the model for cybersecurity
investments. Further, the review emphasizes the role of internal auditing and controls to improve
cybersecurity.
Keywords Accounting, Cybersecurity, Auditing, Risk management, Digitalization
Paper type Literature review
1. Introduction
The increasing use of digital technologies among companies has emphasized the importance
and role of cybersecurity as a new risk management dimension, not least because cyber
threats and risks have attracted significant attention from the public (Amir et al., 2018; Li
et al., 2018). Furthermore, firms hit by cyber-attacks tend to suffer long-lasting economic and
reputational losses (Agrafiotis et al., 2018; Kamiya et al., 2018). Recent studies suggest that
over the course of just a few years, cybersecurity has grown into one of the most significant
risk challenges facing every type of organization and society (IIA, 2018; Islam et al., 2018;
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Kahyaoglu and Caliyurt, 2018). For instance, Gordon et al. (2015b) argued that it is possible
that a cybersecurity breach could shut down an entire critical infrastructure industry and
threaten a nation’s entire economy and national defense. Cybersecurity is more often
acknowledged as a severe organizational concern best addressed by integrating it as a part
of managerial control system (Gordon et al., 2008). This development is partly because of
enforcement and supervision by regulatory authorities (SEC, 2018ab), and partly
because of increased guidance from the Big 4 accounting firms and audit industry
organizations (AICPA, 2018a, 2018b); market discipline also plays a part (Gordon et al.,
2010, 2011; Berkman et al., 2018; Amir et al., 2018). As a part of a managerial control
system, cybersecurity has also become very much a managerial accounting and
auditing matter, subject to cost-benefit analysis, internal control assessment and
disclosure policy considerations. According to Gordon and Loeb (2006), the objectives
of cybersecurity can be divided into three broad categories. First, cybersecurity
protects the confidentiality of private information; second, it ensures that authorized
users can access information on a timely basis and third, cybersecurity protects the
accuracy, reliability and validity of information. The purpose of this paper is to
advance the research on cybersecurity in the accounting domain by investigating how
well recent literature addresses the accounting implications of those objectives. We
synthesize cybersecurity research in the accounting context into different categories
intending to inform the reader of the learning available from the prior literature and
which avenues of research require further investigation.
This literature synthesis has three primary objectives. The first is to provide a
comprehensive overview of the current academic knowledge on cybersecurity in
accounting and auditing research and to provide a set of categories into which these
studies fit. The second objective is to identify key topics and issues that have appeared
in the previous literature. Finally, the third objective is to identify gaps in the literature
and suggest fruitful future research opportunities. This literature analysis has
significant implications for research and practice by detailing, for example, the benefits
of and obstacles to information sharing. This synthesis also highlights the importance
of the model for information-security (cybersecurity) investments by Gordon and Loeb
(2002). Their model has received a significant amount of attention in the literature and
is known as the Gordon–Loeb Model. By providing an economic model that determines
the optimal amount to invest in protecting a given set of information, it contributes to
scientific research and practice.
Moreover, this synthesis highlights the role of internal auditing and controls to
improve cybersecurity. It emphasizes that the cooperation between internal auditing
and information-security functions should be uncomplicated and smooth. Finally, given
the significance of cybersecurity to the field of accounting in today’s interconnected
digital environment, a synthesis paper that focuses on cybersecurity from an
accounting perspective could help to stimulate much-needed cybersecurity research by
accounting academics and practitioners. Furthermore, this paper conducts citation
analysis, which is essential for analyzing the most-cited articles in the specific research
field (Guffey and Harp, 2017). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the relevant background information on the topic. Section 3 explains
the method used to conceptualize the synthesis. Section 4 presents the examination of
the theoretical and empirical literature and a comprehensive list of topics examined in
prior cybersecurity studies in the accounting field. Section 5 provides the citation
analysis. Finally, in Section 6, the conclusions are summarized and avenues for future
studies are suggested.
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2. Background
2.1 Cybersecurity risk management reporting
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (2018a, p. 1) stated that
“Cybersecurity is one of the top issues on the minds of management and boards in nearly
every company in the world—large and small, public and private.”Therefore, it is extremely
important that every organization at least consider a cybersecurity risk management
program. In addition, certain organizations and their stakeholders need timely, useful
information about organizations’ cybersecurity risk management efforts. Therefore, it is
vital that the AICPA (2018a, 2018b) has a goal to establish a common, underlying language
for cybersecurity risk management reporting (for the US generally accepted accounting
principles and/or the international financial reporting standards). Accordingly, the AICPA
(2018a) highlighted that cybersecurity is not just an information technology (IT) problem; it
is an enterprise risk management problem that requires a global solution. The AICPA
(2018b) also emphasized the importance of the entity-level cybersecurity reporting
framework. It explicitly stated that the goal of the reporting framework is to provide ameans
by which organizations can communicate useful information regarding their cybersecurity
risk management programs to stakeholders. Hence, the reporting framework is used to
perform an examination-level attestation engagement. The framework is a key component of
a new System and Organization Control (SOC) for cybersecurity engagement. The
cybersecurity report includes the following three key sets of information:
(1) the management’s description;
(2) the management’s assertion; and
(3) the practitioner’s opinion.
To conclude, the AICPA (2018b) emphasized that its cybersecurity risk management
reporting framework is a crucial first step toward enabling a consistent, market-based,
business-based solution for companies to communicate successfully with key stakeholders
on how they are managing cybersecurity risk.
In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2018, p. 4) argued that it is
essential that:
Public companies take all required actions to inform investors about material cybersecurity risks
and incidents in a timely fashion, including those companies that are subject to material
cybersecurity risks but may not yet have been the target of a cyber-attack.
The increasing significance of cybersecurity incidents persuaded the SEC that it should
provide further guidance, and in 2011, it released its first guidelines on cybersecurity. The
SEC continues to consider other means of promoting appropriate disclosure of cyber
incidents and is reinforcing and expanding that 2011 guidance. Specifically, the SEC is
addressing two topics that were not developed earlier, namely the importance of
cybersecurity policies and procedures and the application of insider trading prohibitions in
the cybersecurity context.
2.2 Motivation
An effective review creates a basis for advancing knowledge (Webster and Watson, 2002).
Similarly, why synthesize studies related to cybersecurity in the accounting and auditing
field? The number and severity of cyber threats have been unprecedented in recent years,
and successful cyber-attacks have been reported regularly (Islam et al., 2018). Moreover, the
costs of cyber-attacks are tremendous; therefore, cybersecurity risk management is argued
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to be extremely important for organizations (Islam et al., 2018). In relation to this, Hausken
(2006, p. 630) asserted that “the intensity of cyber war has increased through the internet
revolution.” Relatedly, Gordon et al. (2003) suggested that the internet revolution has
dramatically changed the way in which individuals, firms and the government
communicate and conduct business. The authors argued that the telecommunications,
banking and finance, energy and transportation industries, as well as the military and other
essential government services, all depend on the Internet. Moreover, they concluded that this
widespread interconnectivity has increased the vulnerability of computer systems. The
same research also highlights how the links between public policy and information security
are clear. For instance, the threat of cyber terrorism, aimed at shutting down critical
infrastructure industries, has brought cybersecurity to the forefront of the public policy
agenda. In addition, Gansler and Lucyshyn (2005) stated that the growing dependence of
both public and private sectors on Web-based technologies and networks for their financial
management systems does not come without a price, and this price is increased
vulnerability. Hence according to the World Bank (2018), the financial service sector was
attacked more than any other industry in 2016. However, Lainhart (2000) had already
claimed that for many organizations, information and the technology that supports it
represent their most valuable assets. Lainhart (2000) argued that in this global information
society, in which information travels through cyberspace, its effective management is
critical. Effective management is in turn related to the awareness of increasing
vulnerabilities, such as cyber threats and information warfare. Organizations’ incentives to
invest in security technology are influenced by regulation. For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (SOX) placed strict requirements on firms (Hausken, 2006). The SOX highlights
the significance of information system controls by requiring the management and auditors
to report on the effectiveness of internal controls over the financial reporting component of
the firm’s management information systems (Li et al., 2012). For example, Gordon et al.
(2006) empirically examined the impact of the SOX on the voluntary disclosure of
information-security activities by corporations. The empirical evidence provided clearly
indicated that the SOX is having a positive impact on voluntary disclosure. Gordon et al.
(2006) offered strong indirect evidence that corporate information-security activities have
attracted more attention since the passage of the SOX than before it was enacted. Indeed,
they supported the widely held view that cybersecurity is an implicit requirement of the
internal control structure. Overall, they argued that the information content of information-
security activities is higher in some industries than in others. Firms in industries such as
banks, business services, insurance, telecommunications, financial services, transportation
and health care appear to be more proactive in providing voluntary disclosure of security-
related activities (Gordon et al., 2006). In addition, Gordon and Loeb (2006) suggested
guidelines for the efficient management of cybersecurity. Their cost-benefit analysis
compared the costs of an activity with its benefits, and the authors argued that as long as
the benefits of an additional information-security activity exceed its costs, it is valuable to
engage in that activity. Further, they asserted that while more cybersecurity does not
always benefit an organization, cyber-attacks are one of the main risks that organizations
must control (Amir et al., 2018).
Based on the above arguments, it is vital to synthesize the previous literature related
to cybersecurity and identify the research streams of the articles under review. To the
authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to describe and synthesize the cybersecurity-
related accounting and auditing studies. For instance, earlier review studies related to
the topic have discussed research opportunities in IT and internal auditing
Cybersecurity
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(Weidenmier and Ramamoorti, 2006) and the impact of information-security events on
the stock market (Spanos and Angelis, 2016).
3. Terminology and methodology
3.1 Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is often used as an analogous term for information security. However,
cybersecurity is not necessarily only the protection of cyberspace itself but also the
protection of those who function in cyberspace and any of their assets that can be reached
via cyberspace (von Solms and van Niekerk, 2013). Cybersecurity comprises technologies,
processes and controls that are designed to protect systems, networks and data from cyber-
attacks. Effective cybersecurity reduces the risk of cyber-attacks and protects societies,
organizations and individuals from the unauthorized exploitation of systems, networks and
technologies. Cybersecurity is an umbrella concept that encompasses information security
and information assurance (Gyun No and Vasarhelyi, 2017). Thus, cybersecurity involves
the protection of information that is assessed and transmitted via any computer network
(Gordon and Loeb, 2006).
3.2 Method
To introduce, summarize and analyze the extent of the research on cybersecurity in the
accounting field, a list of published studies was collected using the following methods. The
articles collected were identified through a systematic process that combined electronic and
manual research. The combinations of keywords used to search for relevant studies
included cybersecurity, cyber, information security, security threats and cyber threats. An
electronic search was performed using Scopus and Google Scholar. A manual search was
also conducted by tracking down references in the collected studies to guarantee that all the
relevant papers were included in the analysis.This paper reviews 39 studies related to
cybersecurity; the majority of the studies were published in high-quality, prominent, peer-
reviewed, accounting and auditing journals between 2000 and 2018. Table I provides a count
of the studies reviewed, grouped by source journal, while Table II presents the topics, the
types of articles and the key research findings related to cybersecurity. It should be noted
that there is considerable variation between the methodologies of the papers under review.
For instance, the articles consist of analytical, conceptual and exploratory studies. However,
the most common are empirical studies using regression analysis. As shown in Table I, the
collected articles come from high-quality accounting and auditing journals, including, for
Table I.
Breakdown of
studies reviewed
Accounting, Organizations and Society 1
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 1
European Accounting Review 1
Information Systems Research 1
International Journal of Accounting and Information Management 1
International Journal of Accounting Information Systems 3
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 7
Journal of Emerging Technologies in Accounting 1
Journal of Information Security 3
Journal of Information Systems 11
Managerial Auditing Journal 6
MIS Quarterly 2
Review of Accounting Studies 1
Total 39
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Author(s) Research topic
Type of the paper/Conclusions that are related to
cybersecurity
Panel A. Information sharing and cybersecurity (4)
Gordon et al., 2003 Sharing information on
computer systems
security: An economic
analysis
Analytical study. Gordon et al., suggested that
information sharing concerning security breaches
can lead to an increased level of information
security
Gansler and Lucyshyn,
2005
Improving the security of
financial management
systems: What are we to
do?
Research note. Gansler and Lucyshyn suggested
that to avoid cyber-attacks every organization
should implement a cybersecurity program, but this
is often done with limited success, because it is
challenging to estimate risk and the security
landscape is constantly changing
Hausken, 2007 Information sharing
among firms and cyber-
attacks
Analytical study. Hausken suggested that assessing
costs and benefits of information sharing and
security investment are interlinked with other
strategies to gain competitive advantage
Gordon et al., 2015a The impact of information
sharing on cybersecurity
underinvestment: A real
options perspective
Empirical study using real options perspective.
Gordon et al. suggested that maintaining adequate
cybersecurity is crucial for a firm to maintain the
integrity of its external and internal financial
reports, as well as to protect the firm’s strategic
proprietary information
Panel B. Cybersecurity investments (8)
Gordon and Loeb, 2002 The economics of
information-security
investment
Analytical study. Gordon and Loeb aimed to derive
an economic model that determines the optimal
amount to invest in information security. Based on
the Gordon–Loeb Model, the findings indicate that
the amount a firm should spend to protect
information sets should generally be only a small
fraction of the expected loss
Tanaka et al., 2005 Vulnerability and
information-security
investment: An empirical
analysis of E-local
government in Japan
Empirical study using regression analysis. The
authors utilized the Gordon–Loeb Model and
suggested that the decision related to the
information-security investments depends on
vulnerability. Their findings supported the insights
of the Gordon and Loeb (2002) model
Hausken, 2006 Income, interdependence,
and substitution effects
affecting incentives for
security investment
Analytical study. Hausken concluded that each firm
invests in security technology when the required
rate of return from security investment exceeds the
average attack level, or when the formal control
requirements dictate investment
Gordon et al., 2008 Cybersecurity, Capital
Allocations and
Management Control
Systems
Analytical study. Gordon et al., argued that the
design and use of management control systems can
play a key role in dealing with cybersecurity issues
Bose and Luo, 2014 Investigating security
investment impact on firm
performance
Conceptual study. Their study proposes a
comprehensive conceptual framework where non-
IT-related and IT-related security investment
factors are posited to influence a firm’s performance
(continued )
Table II.
Studies on
cybersecurity
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Author(s) Research topic
Type of the paper/Conclusions that are related to
cybersecurity
Gordon et al., 2015b Externalities and the
Magnitude of
Cybersecurity
Underinvestment by
Private Sector Firms: A
Modification of the
Gordon–Loeb Model
Analytical study. The authors continue to extend
the Gordon–Loeb Model to incorporate externalities
in deciding on the appropriate level of cybersecurity
investment. The authors show that the firm’s social
optimal investment in cyber security increases by
no more than 37% of the expected externality loss
Gordon et al., 2016 Investing in
Cybersecurity: Insights
from the Gordon–Loeb
Model
Conceptual study. This paper explains how
organizations could use, based on four simple steps,
the Gordon and Loeb (2002). Thus, this paper has
provided a conceptual explanation, accompanied by
an illustrative example, of how organizations can
use the Gordon–Loeb Model to derive their
appropriate level of cybersecurity investment
Gordon et al., 2018 Empirical Evidence on the
Determinants of
Cybersecurity
Investments in Private
Sector Firms
Empirical study using instrument survey and
regression analysis. Gordon et al., indicate that
there is a significant positive association between
firms’ spending on cybersecurity activities and their
treatment of cybersecurity as an important
component of the firm’s internal controls over
financial reporting
Panel C. Internal audit, controls, and cybersecurity (13)
Lainhart, 2000 COBITTM: A
Methodology for
Managing and Controlling
Information and
Information Technology
Risks and Vulnerabilities
Research note. Lainhart (2000) argued that in this
global information society where information
travels through cyberspace the effective
management of information is very important
Pathak, 2005 Risk management,
internal controls and
organizational
vulnerabilities
Research note. Pathak (2005) argued that cyber-
attacks followed by physical attacks against critical
infrastructure are a real threat, however, little is
being done to provide a comprehensive defense
against such a threat
Wallace et al., 2011 Information security and
Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance
Exploratory study. The results reveal that
organizations differ in their implementation of
certain IT controls based on different attributes
Li et al., 2012 The consequences of
information technology
control weaknesses on
management information
systems: The case of
Sarbanes-Oxley internal
control reports
Empirical study using regression analysis. The
authors examined three dimensions of information
technology material weaknesses: data processing
integrity, system access and security and system
structure and usage. The authors find that the
association with forecast accuracy appears to be
strongest for IT control weaknesses most directly
related to data processing integrity
Steinbart et al., 2012 The relationship between
internal audit and
information security
Exploratory study. Steinbart et al., stated that the
internal audit and information-security functions
should co-operate synergistically
(continued )Table II.
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Author(s) Research topic
Type of the paper/Conclusions that are related to
cybersecurity
Steinbart et al., 2013 Information-security
professionals’ perceptions
about the relationship
between the information
security and IAFs
Empirical study using survey instrument and
Partial Least Squares (PLS). Steinbart et al., suggest
that information-security professionals’ perceptions
about the level of technical expertise possessed by
internal auditors and the extent of internal audit
review of information security are positively
associated with the assessment about the quality of
the relationship between the two functions
Steinbart et al., 2016 SECURQUAL: An
Instrument for Evaluating
the Effectiveness of
Enterprise Information
Security Programs
Empirical study using survey data and factor
analysis. The authors emphasize that SECURQUAL
scores reliably predict objective measures of
information-security program effectiveness
Rahimian et al., 2016 Estimation of deficiency
risk and prioritization of
information-security
controls
Empirical study using design science approach.
The results indicate that the Operational, Public
image, Legal (OPL) model can be used to create a
detailed risk assessment of all corporate data
Gyun No and
Vasarhelyi, 2017
Cybersecurity and
Continuous Assurance
Research note. The authors addressed the most
pressing topics in cybersecurity: the need for new
approaches for its assurance
Islam et al., 2018 Factors associated with
security/cybersecurity
audit by IAF: An
international study
Empirical analysis using regression analysis. Islam
et al. (2018) examined the factors associated with
the extent of cybersecurity audit by the internal
audit function (IAF) of the firm. The authors
suggested that the extent of cybersecurity audit by
IAF is significantly and positively associated with
IAF competence related to governance, risk and
control
Kahyaoglu and
Caliyurt, 2018
Cyber security assurance
process from the internal
audit perspective
Conceptual study. The authors concluded that
cyber-risk must be managed and stated that it is
very important to maintain formal documentation
on related cyber controls and internal audit should
be an integral part of cybersecurity assurance
process, as internal audits have a unique capacity to
look across organizations
Stafford et al., 2018 The role of internal audit
and user training in
information-security
policy compliance
Qualitative case analysis. Stafford et al. examined
the role of information-security policy compliance
and the role of information systems auditing in
identifying non-compliance in the workplace. The
study is a qualitative case analysis of technology
user security perceptions combined with
interpretive analysis of depth interviews with
auditors. The findings indicate that enterprise risk
management benefits from audits
Steinbart et al., 2018 The influence of a good
relationship between the
internal audit and
information-security
functions on information-
security outcomes
Empirical study using survey data and PLS. The
authors investigate how the quality of the
relationship between the internal audit and the
information-security functions affects objective
measures of the overall effectiveness of an
organization's information-security efforts. The
(continued ) Table II.
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Author(s) Research topic
Type of the paper/Conclusions that are related to
cybersecurity
quality of this relationship has a positive effect on
the number of reported internal control weaknesses
and incidents of non-compliance, as well as on the
numbers of security incidents detected both before
and after they caused material harm to the
organization
Panel D. Disclosure of cybersecurity activities (5)
Gordon et al., 2006 The impact of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on
the corporate disclosures
of information-security
activities
Empirical study. The results reveal that SOX is
having a positive impact on voluntary disclosure.
Gordon et al., provide strong indirect evidence that
corporate information-security activities are
receiving more focus since the passage of SOX than
before SOX was enacted
Gordon et al., 2010 Market value of voluntary
disclosures concerning
information security
Empirical study using regression analysis. This
article aims to examine market value of voluntary
disclosures of items pertaining to information
security. The findings provide strong evidence that
voluntarily disclosing items concerning information
security is associated positively with the market
value of a firm
Wang et al., 2013 The Association Between
the Disclosure and the
Realization of Information
Security Risk
Mixed methods. Wang et al. evaluated how the
nature of the disclosed security risk factors is
associated with future breach announcements
reported in the media. Their model is able to
accurately associate disclosure characteristics with
breach announcements about 77% of the time
Li et al. (2018) SEC's cybersecurity
disclosure guidance and
disclosed cybersecurity
risk factors
Empirical study using regression analysis. Li et al.,
investigate whether cybersecurity risk disclosure is
informative for future cybersecurity incidents. The
authors suggest that the presence in the pre-
guidance period and length of cybersecurity risk
disclosure are positively associated with
subsequent cybersecurity incidents
Ettredge et al. (2018) Trade Secrets and
Cybersecurity Breaches
Empirical study using regression analysis. The
authors find that firms mentioning the existence of
trade secrets have a significantly higher subsequent
probability of being breached relative to firms that
do not do so
Panel E. Security threats and security breaches (9)
Ettredge and
Richardson, 2003
Information Transfer
among Internet Firms:
The Case of Hacker
Attacks
Empirical study using regression analysis. The
authors showed negative mean abnormal returns
among internet firms that have not actually been
attacked. Further, they suggested that investors
believed that firms would respond to the hacker
attacks with higher spending on IT security
Boritz and No, 2005 Security in XML-based
financial reporting
services on the Internet
Conceptual study. The authors presented security
threats and limitations of current security
technologies. The authors also identified security
(continued )Table II.
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instance, Accounting, Organization and Society, Review of Accounting Studies, International
Journal of Accounting and Information Management, Journal of Information Systems,
International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Journal of Accounting and Public
Policy, European Accounting Review and Managerial Auditing Journal. The prevalence of
cybersecurity-related studies in major accounting and auditing journals emphasizes the
Author(s) Research topic
Type of the paper/Conclusions that are related to
cybersecurity
requirements that should be considered to ensure
reliable, trustworthy XBRL and XARL services
Abu-Musa, 2006 Perceived security threats
of computerized
accounting information
systems in the Egyptian
banking industry
Empirical study using survey data. Abu-Musa
(2006) suggested that accidental entry of bad data
by employees, accidental destruction of data by
employees, introduction of computer viruses to the
system, natural and human-made disasters,
employees’ sharing of passwords, and misdirecting
prints and distributing information to unauthorized
people are the most serious security threats
Kwon et al., 2013 The Association between
Top Management
Involvement and
Compensation and
Information Security
Breaches
Empirical study using regression analysis. The
findings present how an IT executive’s status in the
top management team and the composition of his/
her compensation can be related to a firm’s IT
governance mechanisms
Higgs et al., 2016 The Relationship Between
Board-Level Technology
Committees and Reported
Security Breaches
Empirical study using regression analysis. Using
reported security breaches during the period 2005–
2014, results reveal that firms with technology
committees are more likely to have reported
breaches in a given year than are firms without the
committee
Carré et al., 2018 Ascribing responsibility
for online security and
data breaches
Exploratory study. The authors reveal that
individuals held companies more responsible for
protecting private data and held companies even
more responsible following a data breach
Curtis et al., 2018 Consumer security
behaviors and trust
following a data breach
Exploratory study. The authors’ summary is that
online security is of great concern and companies
that have had a breach face reputational damage
Smith et al., 2018 Do Auditors Price Breach
Risk in Their Audit Fees?
Empirical study using regression analysis. The
authors suggest that breaches are associated with
an increase in fees, but the result is driven by
external breaches. Further, the study reveals the
presence of board-level risk committees and more
active audit committees may help mitigate the
breach risk audit fee premium
Amir et al., 2018 Do firms underreport
information on cyber-
attacks? Evidence from
capital markets
Empirical study using regression analysis. The
findings reveal that the market reaction to disclosed
cyber-attacks is indeed small, but the market
reaction to withheld attacks is negative and
significant
Note: The number of articles within each stream is presented in parentheses Table II.
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topic’s significance to the literature. Other journals are also included in the review because
articles in them clearly have an accounting perspective. These journals are mainly related to
information management. The search included publications up to October 1, 2018. Figure 1
presents the trends of cybersecurity-related studies in the accounting and auditing
literature over the period 2000-2018. To conclude, 39 studies fulfilled the selection
criteria. After the selection of the studies, the articles were carefully read and analyzed
in a rather inductive manner. The overall purpose was to introduce, summarize and
analyze the extent of research on cybersecurity, and there were no predispositions
regarding the topics that would be covered. Rather, based on an initial review of each
selected paper, notes were made on various aspects, such as research questions,
hypotheses and results. After analyzing the papers, a set of categories into which
these 39 studies fit could be constructed. Hence, these categories are the result of a
critical and constructive analysis of the studies under review through summary,
analysis and comparison. To clarify, this synthesis identified five research streams
that are related to cybersecurity. Furthermore, it is essential to categorize the
research streams related to cybersecurity in the accounting field to provide data on
the level of activity in a particular research field, allowing the outcomes to be used to
evaluate the performance of research streams, researchers and journals.
Methodologically, this study builds on the previous literature to deepen the
understanding of cybersecurity research. To clarify, the article is not directed at a
specific cybersecurity-related question or issue or restricted to a specific geography.
It is more comprehensive and provides relatively broad coverage of cybersecurity (in
accounting) research topics. Hence, the article provides a cohesive picture of the
theoretical and empirical archival literature related to cybersecurity. In terms of
structure, it is divided into sections based on the topics covered. Therefore, academics
or practitioners working on specific cybersecurity-related topics should be able to
benefit from reading even a limited part of this paper. Furthermore, Figure 2
illustrates the research streams and factors related to cybersecurity stemming from
the studies under review. Hence, Figure 2 incorporates the research categories,
identified by section number, and presents the interrelations between the sections. It
appears to show that the studies surveyed are concentrated in the left-most elements
(text boxes). However, accounting journals publish a broad variety of research; hence,
Figure 1.
Trends of
cybersecurity-related
studies over the
period of 2000-2018
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there might be opportunities to investigate and publish topics related to the right-
most elements in the future. Future research ideas are discussed in more detail in
Section 6.
4. Previous theoretical and empirical literature
4.1 Information sharing and cybersecurity
The first research stream identified in this synthesis examines information sharing and its
role in cybersecurity. The prior literature has suggested that information sharing in
cybersecurity has become extremely important for accounting and public policy. Gordon
et al. (2003) examined information sharing in relation to computer system security. Their
findings indicated that sharing information about threats and breaches of computer security
lowers the overall costs of achieving any particular level of cybersecurity. Therefore, they
suggested (p. 481) that sharing information “has been promoted as an important tool in
enhancing social welfare.” However, while their analysis showed that information sharing
does indeed offer the potential to reduce overall security costs and raise social welfare, some
pitfalls exist that may well prevent the realization of the full potential benefits. These pitfalls
concern the need to create economic incentives to facilitate effective information sharing
related to cybersecurity. In other words, Gordon et al. (2003) suggested that companies and
society could benefit from sharing information concerning security breaches. However,
without appropriate economic incentives, firms may try to exploit the security expenditure
of others. Similarly, Gansler and Lucyshyn (2005) suggested that the vulnerabilities
associated with cyber-attacks are often exploited by a variety of threats: hackers, insiders,
criminals, terrorists or possibly a combination of those. The authors argued that to avoid
cyber-attacks, every organization should implement a cybersecurity program, but this
might often achieve only limited success, because it is challenging to estimate risk, and the
security landscape is constantly changing. Gansler and Lucyshyn (2005) stated that the
current cyber threats are fairly well understood, but firms are not always proactive enough.
They also claimed that it has been generally assumed that a key element required to
improve cybersecurity is the sharing of information, because “having information on threats
and on actual incidents experienced by others can help an organization better understand
the risks faced and determine what preventive measures should be implemented” (Gansler
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and Lucyshyn, 2005, p. 6). They concluded that the importance of financial management
systems in a cybersecurity process should be highlighted. In addition, they argued that the
USA is already the nation most dependent on information systems. Therefore, the
consequences of the vulnerability of information systems should be considered extremely
carefully (Gansler and Lucyshyn, 2005).
In contrast, Hausken (2007) suggested that assessing the costs and benefits of
information sharing and security investment is interlinked with other strategies to gain a
competitive advantage. Hausken (2007, p. 641) argued that:
The security of an interlinked information system depends on the strategies about information
sharing and security investment chosen by all actors, including those that are players in it, those
that attempt to regulate and reshape it and those that attempt to shut it down, which opens a role
for public policy.
Hausken (2007) considered two firms that are subject to cyber-attacks. The firms defend
themselves by sharing information with each other and investing in security. Each firm
chooses to receive information about the other firm’s security breaches. Hausken (2007)
analyzed the incentives to voluntarily provide information to another firm and the trade-offs
that each firm makes between sharing information and investing in security. The same
research introduced the classic free-rider problem to explain why information sharing often
does not occur, and also highlighted that the classic free-rider was also identified by Gordon
et al. (2003). Hausken (2007, p. 674) indicated that “information sharing increases linearly in
the interdependence between firms, and is zero with negative or no interdependence.” To
conclude, Hausken (2007, p. 647) suggested that “it is the interdependence between firms
that is the key determinator of information sharing and not the competitiveness.” On a
related note, Gordon et al. (2015a) suggested that academics, government officials and
corporate executives have recommended information sharing related to cybersecurity,
explaining that:
The argument for sharing information is based on the belief that firms can reduce their
cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities and, in turn, cyber incidences, based on the experiences of
other (especially similar) firms (p. 518).
Based on a real-options perspective, they demonstrated that “information sharing, with its
ability to reduce the uncertainty associated with cybersecurity investments, may well result
in reducing the tendency by private-sector firms to underinvest in cybersecurity activities”
(Gordon et al., 2015a, p. 518). Furthermore, the study suggested that the benefit gained from
information sharing could provide a vital incentive to overcome firms’ unwillingness to
share their private information actively.
4.2 Cybersecurity investments
The second research stream identified concentrates on cybersecurity investments. Given the
significance of cybersecurity to organizations, a fundamental economics-based question has
been brought up regularly in prior studies: How much should be invested in cybersecurity-
related activities? Gordon and Loeb (2002) presented a model to address this research
question, and this model has received considerable attention in the literature, in which it is
known as the Gordon–Loeb Model. The originators argued that because of the information-
intense characteristics of a modern economy (e.g. the Internet and the World Wide Web),
information security is a growing spending priority for most companies around the world,
which prompted them to create an economic model that determines the optimal amount to
invest in information security. To be more specific, they stated that the term information
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security in their model can be interpreted broadly. The Gordon–Loeb Model is applicable to
investments related to various information-security goals, for instance protecting the
confidentiality, availability and integrity of information. Hence, the model is also applicable
to cybersecurity investments.
To summarize, their findings indicated that the optimal amount to spend on protecting
information sets does not always increase with the level of vulnerability of such information.
The Gordon–Loeb Model can be interpreted as suggesting that the amount that a firm
should spend on protecting information sets should generally be only a small fraction of the
expected loss, and accordingly, the findings showed that “managers allocating an
information-security budget should normally focus on information that falls into the
midrange of vulnerability to security breaches” (Gordon and Loeb, 2002, p. 453). “Since
extremely vulnerable information sets may be inordinately expensive to protect, a firm may
be better off concentrating its efforts on information sets with midrange vulnerabilities”
(Gordon and Loeb, 2002, p. 438). Moreover, Gordon et al. (2016) discussed the Gordon–Loeb
Model with a focus on providing insights to aid the model’s use in a practical setting. They
highlighted that despite its mathematical underpinnings:
The Gordon–Loeb Model provides an intuitive framework that lends itself to an easily understood
set of steps for deriving an organization’s cybersecurity investment level. These four steps are: (i)
to estimate the value, and thus the potential loss, for each information set in the organization; (ii)
to estimate the probability that an information set will be breached based on the information set’s
vulnerability; (iii) to create a grid of all possible combinations of steps 1 and 2 above; and finally
(iv) to derive the level of cybersecurity investment by allocating funds to protect the information
sets, subject to the constraint that the incremental benefits from additional investments exceed (or
are at least equal to) the incremental costs of the investment. (Gordon et al., 2016, pp. 57–58)
Similarly, Tanaka et al. (2005) studied the relationship between vulnerability and
information-security investment using data on Japanese municipal authorities. They
exploited the Gordon–Loeb Model and suggested that the decision related to information-
security investments depends on vulnerability. Their findings revealed that the municipal
authorities examined did not commit higher-than-usual expenditures on information
security if the vulnerability levels were low or extremely high; however, in contrast, they
invested more than usual if the vulnerability levels were medium-high. Therefore, Tanaka
et al.’s findings supported the insights provided by Gordon and Loeb’s (2002) model.
Moreover, Gordon et al. (2015b) extended the Gordon–Loeb Model to derive the optimal level
of investment in cybersecurity activities. They investigated how the existence of well-
recognized externalities changes the maximum that a firm should, from a social welfare
perspective, invest in cybersecurity activities. They showed that a firm’s social optimal
investment in cybersecurity increases by no more than 37 per cent of the expected
externality loss. Gordon et al.’s (2015b) results have important implications for practice
because they indicate that unless private-sector firms consider the costs of breaches
associated with externalities, in addition to the private costs resulting from breaches,
underinvestment in cybersecurity activities is essentially a given. Therefore, the authors
concluded that cybersecurity underinvestment might pose a serious threat to national
security and to the economic prosperity of a jurisdiction. In relation to this, they suggested
that “governments around the world are justified in considering regulations and/or
incentives designed to increase cybersecurity investments by private sector firms” (Gordon
et al., 2015b, p. 29). The latest study by Gordon et al. (2018) found a significant positive
association between the importance that firms attach to cybersecurity for internal control
purposes and the percentage of their IT budget spent on cybersecurity activities;
accordingly, the study (2018, p. 133) suggests that “treating cybersecurity as an important
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component of a firm’s internal control system serves as an incentive for private firms to
invest in cybersecurity activities.” The prior literature has also discussed other approaches
to evaluating cybersecurity investments. For instance, Hausken (2006) argued that firms are
threatened with cyber-attacks and invest increasingly in security technology. A variety of
principles are applied to determine the size of the investment. However, firms’ incentives to
invest in security technology are also influenced by law. As mentioned earlier, the SOX
imposed strict requirements. Hausken (2006) stated that firms invest maximally in
security when the average attack level is 25 per cent of the firm’s required rate of return.
Hausken (2006, p. 629) emphasized that “each firm invests in security technology when the
required rate of return from security investment exceeds the average attack level, or when
the formal control requirements dictate investment.”
Similarly, Bose and Luo (2014) argued that today’s organizations are challenged by the
threats of cybersecurity, It is therefore essential for organizations of different sizes and types
to understand the potential impacts of cybersecurity on organizational performance. Bose
and Luo (2014, p. 204) highlighted that “security investments need to be made by
organizations to help secure their tangible and intangible or physical and intellectual
assets.” Moreover, they argued that understanding organizational cybersecurity now
involves drawing from a holistic view of not only technical but also financial, legal and
policy aspects. In conclusion, the study proposed a comprehensive conceptual framework in
which non-IT-related and IT-related security investment factors are posited to influence a
firm’s performance. The authors put forward 14 propositions[1] to understand the
relationship between security investments and firm performance.
Finally, Gordon et al. (2008) stated that cybersecurity breaches represent an important
component of the enterprise risk confronting organizations. They therefore argued that
security audits are simultaneously gaining in popularity. Gordon et al. (2008, p. 216)
concluded that “the information security audit component of a management control system
is useful in mitigating an agent’s empire building preferences in addressing cybersecurity
threats.” By implication, the broader objective of their paper was to make the case that
accounting researchers who are concerned with management control systems can, and
should, play a dominant role in addressing issues related to cybersecurity. To be more
specific, Gordon et al. (2008) analyzed the role of security auditing in controlling the natural
tendency of a chief information security officer (CISO) to overinvest in cybersecurity
activities; in essence, they argued that firms can use an information-security audit to reduce
a CISO’s power.
4.3 Internal auditing, controls and cybersecurity
The third research stream concentrates on internal auditing, controls and cybersecurity. For
instance, Pathak (2005) demonstrated the impact of technology convergence on the internal
control mechanism of a firm and suggested that it is important for an auditor to be aware of
the security hazards faced by the financial or even the entire organizational information
system. Pathak (2005) attempted to place the security system design and the organizational
vulnerabilities in the context of the convergence of communication and networking
technologies with the complex IT in business processes. Pathak (2005) also highlighted that
auditors should be aware of technology risk management and its impact on the enterprise’s
internal controls and organizational vulnerabilities.
However, Lainhart (2000) suggested that management needs generally applicable and
accepted IT governance and control practices to benchmark the existing and planned IT
environment. Lainhart (2000, p. 22) stated that “CobitTM is a tool that allows managers to
communicate and bridge the gap with respect to control requirements, technical issues and
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business risks.” Moreover, he suggested that CobitTM enables the development of clear
policy and good practices for IT control throughout firms. Finally, Lainhart (2000)
concluded that CobitTM is intended to be the breakthrough IT governance tool that helps
understand andmanage the risks associated with cybersecurity and information.
Steinbart et al. (2016, p. 71) stated that “the ever-increasing number of security incidents
underscores the need to understand the key determinants of an effective information
security program.” Therefore, they examined the use of the COBIT Version 4.1 Maturity
Model Rubrics to develop an instrument (SECURQUAL) that can obtain an objective
measure of the effectiveness of enterprise information-security programs. They argued that
scores for various rubrics predict four separate types of outcomes, thereby providing a
multidimensional picture of information-security effectiveness. Finally, Steinbart et al. (2016,
p. 88) concluded that:
Researchers can, therefore, use the SECURQUAL instrument to reliably measure the effectiveness
of an organization’s information-security activities, without asking them to divulge sensitive
details that most organizations are unwilling to disclose.
Because the SOX created a resurgence of the organizational focus on internal controls,
Wallace et al. (2011) studied the extent to which the IT controls suggested by the ISO 17799
security framework have been integrated into organizations’ internal control environments.
By surveying the members of the IIA on the usage of IT controls in their organizations, their
results revealed the ten most commonly implemented controls and the ten least commonly
implemented. The findings indicated that organizations may differ in their implementation
of certain IT controls based on the size of the company, whether they are a public or private
organization, the industry to which they belong and the level of training given to IT and
audit personnel. Moreover, Li et al. (2012, p. 180) stated that “SOX guidance and auditing
standards also emphasize the unique benefits that accompany the use of IT-related controls,
including enhancing the usefulness of information produced by the system.”
Hence, using a design science approach, Rahimian et al. (2016) developed the Operational,
Public image, Legal (OPL) multidimensional risk specification model to quantitatively
estimate the contribution of security controls in place as well as the control deficiency risk
because of missing controls. They contributed to the literature by indicating that the OPL
model can be used to create a detailed risk assessment of all corporate data. This finding
was important because it is often difficult for the internal audit function (IAF) to assess
control deficiency risk (CDR) in the area of information security.
In addition to the important topics discussed above, a vital subject within this research
stream is the cooperation between internal auditing and information-security functions. In
many companies, both the information systems and the IAFs are involved with information
security and cybersecurity. Steinbart et al. (2012, p. 228) argued that these functions should
work together synergistically, because:
The information security staff designs, implements, and operates various procedures and
technologies to protect the organization’s information resources, and internal audit provides
periodic feedback concerning effectiveness of those activities along with suggestions for
improvement.
The main contribution of their study was to develop an exploratory model of the factors that
influence the nature of the relationship between the IAF and the information-security
function. These factors are, for instance, the internal auditor’s level of IT knowledge, the
internal auditor’s communication skills and the internal auditor’s attitude (i.e. role
perception).
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In contrast, Steinbart et al. (2013) examined the relationship between the information-
security function and the IAF from the perspective of information security professionals.
The study in question surveyed information-security professionals’ perceptions, and the
findings revealed that:
Information security professionals’ perceptions about the level of technical expertise
possessed by internal auditors and the extent of internal audit review of information
security are positively related to their assessment about the quality of the relationship
between the two functions (Steinbart et al., 2013, p. 65).
Most importantly, the study argued that the quality of the relationship is positively
associated with perceptions of the value provided by internal auditing and with measures of
the overall effectiveness of the organization’s information-security endeavors. The latest
study examining the cooperation between the IAF and the information-security function
was also conducted by Steinbart et al. (2018). This latter study investigated the influence of a
good relationship on information-security outcomes. In other words, using a unique data set,
Steinbart et al. (2018) investigated how the quality of the relationship objectively measures
the overall effectiveness of an organization’s information-security efforts. The findings
highlighted that the quality of the relationship has a positive effect on the number of
reported internal control weaknesses and incidents of non-compliance as well as on the
number of security incidents detected, both before and after they caused material harm to
the organization. Finally, Steinbart et al. (2018, p. 1) emphasized that:
Higher levels of management support for information security and having the chief
information security officer (CISO) report independently of the IT function have a positive
effect on the quality of the relationship between the internal audit and information security
functions.
Instead, Stafford et al. (2018) examined the role of information-security policy compliance
and information system auditing in identifying non-compliance in working environments.
They concentrated on the role of non-malicious insiders who unknowingly or innocuously
thwart corporate cybersecurity directives by engaging in unsafe computing practices.
Hence, they conducted a qualitative case analysis of technology user security perceptions,
combined with an interpretive analysis of in-depth interviews with auditors, to examine and
explain user behaviors in violation of cybersecurity directives. Thus, they determined the
ways in which auditors can best assist management in overcoming the problems associated
with security complacency among users. Their findings indicated that enterprise risk
management (ERM) benefits from audits that identify technology users who might feel
invulnerable to cyber threats. Moreover, Stafford et al. (2018, p. 420) argued that “the IT
auditor is likely the most valuable objective consultant and critic of the process that is
designed to manage and enforce security compliance in the firm.” Nevertheless, the same
report also stated that:
The function of an audit is to consult, to improve and to guide; it is the role of corporate
management to seek and embrace auditing guidance in the matter of improving cybersecurity
(2018, p. 420).
Similarly, Islam et al. (2018) stated that cybersecurity auditing is a relatively new dimension
of security practice intended to support the protection of critical information assets. The
authors added that an auditing process will seek to obtain evidence of organizational
cybersecurity policies and their efficacy for the protection of asset integrity, data
confidentiality and data access and availability. The study points out that managing
cybersecurity is increasingly important for companies because of the growing dependence
of firms on technology for conducting their business, creating a competitive advantage and
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achieving success. Islam et al. (2018) examined the factors associated with the extent of
cybersecurity auditing by the internal audit function (IAF) of the firm. Specifically, they
focused on whether the internal audit function, the certified audit executive’s characteristics,
the board involvement related to governance, the role of the audit committee and the chief
risk officer and the IAF tasked with ERM are associated with the extent to which the firm
engages in cybersecurity auditing. Their results suggested that the extent of cybersecurity
auditing by the IAF is significantly and positively associated with IAF competence related
to governance, risk and control. Board support regarding governance is also significant and
positive. However, the Islam et al. research did not find significant results related to the roles
of the audit committee and the chief risk officer. To conclude, the research argued that
comprehensive risk assessment conducted by the IAF and IAF quality have a significant
and positive effect on a cybersecurity audit. Therefore, the study provides insights into the
specific IAF/certified audit executive characteristics and corporate governance
characteristics that can lead the IAF to contribute significantly to a cybersecurity audit.
In related work, Kahyaoglu and Caliyurt (2018) examined the cybersecurity assurance
process from the internal audit perspective. They developed a model to introduce the way in
which the internal audit and information-security functions could work together to support
organizations in accomplishing a cost-effective level of information security. The key issues
and approaches were explained regarding how to become a trusted cybersecurity advisor,
and a sample cybersecurity awareness program checklist was provided. For instance,
Kahyaoglu and Caliyurt (2018, p. 371) concluded that “internal auditors should expand their
own IT audit capabilities to provide proactive insights and, in this way, they could make
value-added recommendations to management.”
Finally, Gyun No and Vasarhelyi (2017) discussed whether external auditors should be
involved in cybersecurity. First, they stated that cybersecurity can clearly influence the
economic health of an organization, because the estimated average costs of cyber-attacks are
extremely high. Second, auditor competence in this highly technical area of cybersecurity
raises further questions. For instance, are current auditors trained to be involved in
cybersecurity issues? Hence, they stated that auditors might have training in other subject
matters that may overlap with cybersecurity, such as valuation, in which the auditor relies
on specialists to support key assertions. While some firms provide their employees with IT
audit specialization skills, the greater scope of accountant training precludes these skills
(Gyun No and Vasarhelyi, 2017). Further, they argued that if not auditors, then who should
take the role of integrating financial and cyber-risk information into some form of assurance
that can be provided to shareholders? Finally, and most importantly, they discussed the risk
assessment portion of future audits. They concluded that substantive research is needed on
how to integrate the generally qualitative issues of the risk of cyber exposure into the
traditional audit model.
4.4 Disclosure of cybersecurity activities
The fourth research theme contains articles examining the disclosure of cybersecurity
activities. As mentioned earlier, Gordon et al. (2006) highlighted the impact of the SOX
(2002) on the voluntary disclosure of information-security activities by corporations. They
clearly emphasized that the SOX had a positive impact on such disclosure. To clarify, their
findings indicated that the voluntary disclosure of information-security activities had
increased by over 100 per cent since the passage of SOX when compared with two years
prior to the law’s implementation. This was an interesting finding, because the SOX did not
explicitly address the issue of information security. On a related note, Gordon et al. (2010)
examined voluntary disclosures concerning cybersecurity and argued that voluntary
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disclosures in the annual report on cybersecurity allow a corporation to provide signals to
the markets that “the firm is actively engaged in preventing, detecting and correcting
security breaches.”Accordingly, Gordon et al. suggested that it is a strategic choice whether
or not a firm voluntarily decides to disclose items concerning information security; they
further asserted that there is clear evidence that an increasing number of organizations are
voluntarily disclosing information related to cybersecurity. Moreover, Gordon et al.
provided empirical support for the argument that voluntary disclosures related to
cybersecurity are positively and significantly related to the stock price. Their results
indicated generic support for the signaling argument, which states that managers who
disclose information voluntarily are consistent with increasing firm value. Most
importantly, their results showed that “voluntary disclosures related to proactive security
measures by a firm have the greatest impact on the firm’s market” (Gordon et al., 2010,
p. 590).
In contrast, Wang et al. (2013) examined the association between the disclosure and the
realization of information-security risk and stated that firms often disclose information-
security risk factors in public filings. Wang et al. (2013) argued that the internal
cybersecurity information associated with disclosures may be positive or negative. They
evaluated how the nature of the disclosed security risk factors, believed to represent the
firm’s internal information regarding information security, is associated with future breach
announcements reported in the media. The paper presents a decision tree model, which
categorized the occurrence of future security breaches based on the textual contents of the
disclosed security risk factors. The authors’ model was able to associate disclosure
characteristics accurately with breach announcements around 77 per cent of the time. Wang
et al. (2013) also used text-mining techniques to contribute a richer interpretation of the
results. The results showed that the disclosed security risk factors with risk mitigation
themes are less likely to be related to future breach announcements. Their results indicated
that the market reaction following a security breach announcement differs depending on the
nature of the preceding disclosure. To conclude, the study showed that the textual content of
security risk factors is an adequate predictor of future reported breaches. More precisely,
Wang et al. (2013) demonstrated that firms that disclose actionable (risk-mitigating)
information are less likely to be associated with security incidents. The findings indicate
that firms taking proactive action have an incentive to disclose their stance on information
security truthfully.
In addition, Li et al. (2018) investigated whether cybersecurity risk disclosure is
informative for future cybersecurity incidents. They focused on two measures: the presence
of cybersecurity risk disclosure and the length of cybersecurity risk disclosure. They found
that the presence of these risk factors in the pre-guidance period and the length of these risk
factors are related to future reported cybersecurity incidents. However, the findings
indicated that the association between the presence of cybersecurity risk disclosure and
subsequently announced cybersecurity incidents become insignificant after the passage of
the USA Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) cybersecurity disclosure guidance.
Hence, the work of Li et al. (2018) supports the SEC’s decision on underlining cybersecurity
risk disclosure. However, Li et al. pointed out that the SEC’s disclosure guidance may
unintentionally encourage firms to disclose cybersecurity risks regardless of the level of the
risks.
To conclude, the latest study within this research stream examined trade secrets and
cybersecurity breaches. The study conducted by Ettredge et al. (2018) investigated the
association between firms’ disclosures in Forms 10-K of the existence of trade secrets and
cyber theft of corporate data, which they defined as “breaches.” The study contributes to the
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literature by focusing specifically on breaches that target trade secrets, finding that firms
that mention the existence of trade secrets have a significantly higher subsequent
probability of being breached than firms that do not do so. The results were stronger among
younger firms, firms with fewer employees and firms operating in less concentrated
industries.
4.5 Security threats and security breaches
The fifth stream in this synthesis relates to security threats and breaches. Ettredge and
Richardson (2003) had already examined information transfer among internet firms,
defining internet firms as those that “operate in a variety of industries, but are similar in that
they rely almost completely on IT when conducting such fundamental operations as buying
and selling goods and services” (p. 71). More specifically, the article examined the stock
market reaction to the denial of service attacks against certain widely known internet firms
in February 2000. They found that negative mean abnormal returns occurred among
internet firms that were not actually attacked. Interestingly, this happened both within
internet industries in which some firms were attacked and within internet industries in
which no firms were attacked. However, they also suggested that internet firms that were
similar in size to those that were attacked (i.e. relatively large) were more likely to be
attacked in the future. Similarly, Boritz and No (2005) discussed security threats and the
limitations of security technologies. In addition, they studied the security requirements to
ensure reliable, trustworthy financial reporting services. Finally, their paper explained
several proposed security standards and suggested the Web Services Security Architecture
as a suitable security mechanism for financial reporting services. In contrast, Abu-Musa
(2006) investigated the perceived security threats to computerized accounting information
systems in the Egyptian banking industry and emphasized that “advanced technology has
created significant risks related to ensuring the security and integrity of computerized
accounting information systems” (p. 187). However, the findings of the study revealed that
the accidental entry of bad data by employees, the accidental destruction of data by
employees, the introduction of computer viruses to the system, natural and human-made
disasters, employees sharing passwords and misdirecting prints and distributing
information to unauthorized people are perceived to be the most significant security threats.
Surprisingly, the results highlighted that the greatest security concerns are perceived to
come from within rather than from outside the banks. Abu-Musa (2006) concluded that
banks know the threats; their challenge is to overcome them.
Carré et al. (2018) examined consumer reactions to security breaches and sought the best
approach for companies to minimize reputational damage, arguing that “participants
viewed companies as being more responsible for data protection and more responsible after
a data breach than were individuals” (p. 442). Hence, their findings emphasized that there
was no significant difference between participants’ perceptions of companies’ responsibility
to protect data and companies’ responsibility for a data breach occurring.
The fifth study categorized in this theme was conducted by Curtis et al. (2018). They
focused on how security statement certainty (rated as overconfident, underconfident or
realistic) and the behavioral intentions of potential consumers influence the perceptions of
companies in the presence or absence of a past security breach. Curtis et al. (2018) exposed
participants to three types of security statements and randomly assigned them to the
presence or absence of a previous breach. Their findings indicated that the presence or
absence of such a previous breach had a large impact on company perceptions but a
minimal impact on behavioral intentions to be more secure personally. The findings implied
that companies need to be cautious about how much confidence they convey to consumers.
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In addition, the results have social implications; companies need to communicate personal
security behaviors to consumers in a way that not only instills confidence in the company,
but also encourages personal responsibility. They summarized online security as being of
great concern and stated that companies that have experienced a breach face reputational
damage. Their findings further showed that this damage emerges regardless of how
confidently the companies express themselves through security statements.
In contrast, Higgs et al. (2016) investigated the association between board-level technology
committees and reported security breaches. The work highlighted that following several high-
profile data security breaches, corporate boards are prioritizing the oversight of IT risk. Higgs
et al. (2016, p. 79) stated that “firms are also increasingly faced with disclosure decisions
regarding IT security breaches.” Therefore, their paper suggested that firms can use the
formation of a board-level technology committee as part of their IT governance to signal their
ability to detect and respond to security breaches. Referencing reported security breaches during
the period 2005-2014, the findings revealed that firms with a technology committee are more
likely to have reported breaches in a given year than firms without a committee. Moreover, this
positive relationship is driven by relatively young technology committees and external source
breaches. To conclude, Higgs et al. highlighted that the perceived value of a technology
committee mitigates the negative abnormal stock returns arising from external breaches. In
summary, they emphasized that security breaches are costly to firms and the cost is continuing to
increase; hence, firms are increasingly recognizing this phenomenon and considering governance
mechanisms in response. It can be interpreted that the establishment of a specialized board
committee – specifically a technology committee – is an effective response to breach risk. The
second study related to IT governance mechanisms was conducted by Kwon et al. (2013). It
studied how an IT executive’s position in a top management team and compensation are
associated with the likelihood of information-security breaches. Using a sample drawn from
multiple sources in the period from 2003 to 2008, they revealed that an IT executive’s involvement
in the top management team is negatively related to the possibility of information-security
breaches. Finally, further analysis indicated that the amount of behavior-based (i.e. salary)
compensation and the pay differences of outcome-based (i.e. bonuses, stock awards and stock
options) compensation between IT and non-IT executives are negatively associated with the
likelihood of information-security breaches.
Furthermore, researchers have investigated the impact of cybersecurity breaches on the
stock market returns of firms[2]. For example, Amir et al. (2018) concluded that withheld cyber-
attacks are associated with a decline of approximately 3.6 per cent in equity value in the month
when the attack is discovered. Using the market reactions to withheld and disclosed attacks,
they estimated that managers disclose information on cyber-attacks when investors already
suspect a high likelihood (40 per cent) of an attack. However, the final study within this stream
investigated whether auditors price breach risk into their fees and whether a firm’s internal
governance can mitigate the potential increases in audit fees. Smith et al. (2018) suggested that
breaches are associated with an increase in audit fees, but the result was driven by external
breaches. They emphasized that the presence of board-level risk committees and more active
audit committees may help to mitigate the breach risk audit fee premium. Finally, they argued
that both past breach disclosures and future disclosures are associated with audit fees.
5. Citation analysis
Citation analysis is important and useful because it allows influential authors to be
identified, which, in turn, provides researchers with a solid basis for positioning their
current contributions. Therefore, citation analysis was conducted in the context of
cybersecurity-related studies. Google Scholar provides both citation counts and links to the
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sources of the citations (Kenny and Larson, 2018); hence, the number of citations for each
article under review was collected. Table III presents the distribution of citations of the
articles under review. Of these articles, 12 have been cited between one and four times.
However, it must be mentioned that many of the articles are very recent, which could
explain the low number of citations. Furthermore, eight of the articles have been cited
between five and 30 times and nine articles between 30 and 90 times. Table IV reveals the
top 10 ranking of the papers in terms of the highest number of citations. These articles have
more than 90 citations. Table IV also presents the research streams into which the most-
cited articles are categorized. Before discussing the findings, a few important points should
be highlighted. The overall number of citations is 3,057 for all the articles under review. The
most-cited article is that of Gordon and Loeb (2002), with over 1,000 citations. This paper
Table III.
Distribution of
Google Scholar
citations (as of
January 7th, 2019)
Authors
No. of
articles
No. of
citations
Amir et al., 2018; Carré et al., 2018; Curtis et al., 2018; Ettredge et al., 2018; Gordon
et al., 2018; Gyun No and Vasarhelyi, 2017; Islam et al., 2018; Kahyaoglu and
Caliyurt, 2018; Li et al., 2018; Rahimian et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2018; Stafford et al.,
2018
12 0-4
Bose and Luo, 2014; Gansler and Lucyshyn, 2005; Gordon et al., 2016; Gordon et al.,
2008; Higgs et al., 2016; Steinbart et al., 2018; Steinbart et al., 2016; Steinbart et al.,
2013
8 5-30
Abu-Musa, 2006; Gordon et al., 2015a; Gordon et al., 2015b; Hausken, 2007; Kwon
et al., 2013; Pathak, 2005; Steinbart et al., 2012; Wallace et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2013
9 30-90
Boritz and No, 2005; Ettredge and Richardson, 2003; Gordon et al., 2010; Gordon
et al., 2006; Gordon et al., 2003; Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Hausken, 2006; Lainhart,
2000; Li et al., 2012; Tanaka et al., 2005
10 90!
Table IV.
Ten most cited
articles in the field of
cybersecurity
(Google Scholar
citations as of
January 7th, 2019)
Authors Citations and topics
Gordon and Loeb (2002) The economics of information-security investment 1258 (2)
Gordon et al. (2003) Sharing information on computer systems security: An
economic analysis
304 (1)
Lainhart (2000) COBITTM: A methodology for managing and controlling
information and information technology risks and vulnerabilities
141 (3)
Li et al. (2012), The consequences of information technology control weaknesses on
management information systems: The case of Sarbanes-Oxley internal control
reports
135 (3)
Gordon et al. (2010) Market value of voluntary disclosures concerning information
security
135 (4)
Gordon et al. (2006) The impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the corporate
disclosures of information-security activities
133 (4)
Hausken (2006) Income, interdependence, and substitution effects affecting
incentives for security investment
117 (2)
Tanaka et al. (2005) Vulnerability and information-security investment: An
empirical analysis of E-local government in Japan
113 (2)
Boritz, and No (2005) Security in XML-based financial reporting services on the
Internet
112 (5)
Ettredge and Richardson (2003) Information transfer among internet firms: The
case of Hacker attacks
98 (5)
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introduced the Gordon–Loeb Model, which forms the basis for making cybersecurity
investment decisions. The huge amount of citations explains the importance of the model to
the cybersecurity literature. The second most cited study is Gordon et al. (2003), which
suggested that information sharing concerning security breaches can lead to an increased
level of information security. The third most cited study was conducted by Lainhart (2000).
The paper discussed COBITTM, which is a methodology for managing and controlling
information and IT risks and vulnerabilities. To conclude, the topics of the ten most cited
articles stem from the five research streams identified. The citation numbers reflect the
interest in and importance of the topics. Therefore, it can cautiously be suggested that
cybersecurity investments have proven a fascinating topic according to the citation numbers.
6. Conclusions and opportunities for future research
The growing dependence of both public and private firms on information technologies
and networks for their financial management systems increases their vulnerability to
cyber threats (Gansler and Lucyshyn, 2005). In addition, the economy has become more
knowledge-based; therefore, protecting information assets has become a top agenda item
for accountants and managers (Gordon et al., 2008). Cybersecurity has thus increased,
becoming one of the most significant risk management challenges facing every type of
organization within the space of just a few years. For instance, a decade ago, the IAF
evolved and adapted to the increasingly important role that IT was playing in all aspects
of business operations. Today, internal auditing faces the need to adapt once again to
address the critical risks associated with cybersecurity (e.g. IIA, 2018), and this study
emphasizes that cybersecurity has become more and more important for accounting and
public policy. To avoid cyber threats, every organization should implement a
cybersecurity program or a cybersecurity strategy. This also applies to countries and
jurisdictions, and hence, it was argued that it is essential for countries to publish national
cybersecurity strategies. Moreover, many countries frequently identify the state agencies
in charge of setting minimum standards and responding to cyber incidents (World Bank,
2018). To conclude, this study aimed to provide an overview of the literature on what is
currently known about cybersecurity in the accounting and auditing literature. While
synthesizing the literature, this paper suggested a research framework that categorizes
the research themes related to cybersecurity. The following research themes were
identified: cybersecurity and information sharing, cybersecurity investments, internal
auditing and controls related to cybersecurity, disclosure of cybersecurity activities and
security threats and security breaches. Furthermore, this synthesis has practical and
social implications. This synthesis underscores that information sharing is important
and that companies and societies may benefit from it. However, the free-rider problem
explains why firms are sometimes unwilling to engage in it (Gordon et al., 2003; Hausken,
2007). Security breaches affect stock markets; therefore, the investment decisions related
to cybersecurity should be made carefully and should use appropriate models to support
the decisions. Finally, it should be noted that proactiveness matters while disclosing
cybersecurity activities. For example, Gordon et al. (2010) indicated that voluntary
disclosures related to proactive security measures have the greatest impact on the market
value of a firm. In addition, Wang et al. (2013) suggested that firms taking proactive
action have an incentive to disclose their stance on cybersecurity truthfully. Although
previous studies have examined cybersecurity under various research themes, research
on the role of cybersecurity in private and public companies is still relatively scarce.
However, this should not be interpreted as a sign of such research being less relevant. On
the contrary, obtaining a sound understanding of the functioning and value of
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cybersecurity is of high importance, given the dominant and vital role that IT and
digitalization play in the world economy in terms of generating wealth, jobs, innovation
and growth. Hence, this synthesis highlights Figure 2 as a mapping of the research
discussed in the manuscript (left-hand-side themes) in relation to the research themes in
other disciplines (right-hand-side themes). We encourage readers to use Figure 2 as an
instrument to identify possible interdisciplinary research avenues between accounting
and other disciplines. Furthermore, more research and research projects are needed to
determine how to improve cybersecurity, for instance by establishing how the
implementation of cybersecurity strategies and programs could be improved and, after
implementation, how those programs should be maintained and developed. Future studies
should also concentrate on how proactiveness could be enhanced in the context of security
breaches. In addition, researchers should focus on how regulation affects the disclosure of
cybersecurity-related issues and what kind of information firms and organizations disclose.
The prior studies have been silent regarding how the awareness of cybersecurity investments
could be improved, specifically among private firms. Most importantly, the role of
cybersecurity in maintaining societal functionality should be examined carefully. In addition,
the prior research has mainly concentrated on using data from the USA, and future studies
should focus on expanding the research, for instance to the European Union or Asia. For
example, it would be interesting to know what kind of information investors are demanding
about firms’ cybersecurity practices. Given that investors hesitate to invest in firms with a
history of cyber-attacks (Islam et al., 2018), future studies could address how investors’
confidence could be maintained and/or restored. Research concerning the disclosure of
cybersecurity information has been growing in recent years, and future studies should
investigate how the validation of the disclosed information is performed and what role auditors
perform in cybersecurity risk management. Researchers could examine how the training and
competence of auditors related to cybersecurity might be improved. Finally, future studies
could use qualitative methods, as many of the research questions suggested above begin with a
“how” term. Qualitative study techniques are the most appropriate for research on real-life
practices where the purpose is to comprehend “how” and “why” (Yapa et al., 2017). To
conclude, this study encourages researchers to make use of these wide-ranging opportunities.
Notes
1. The non IT-related security investment factors that were posited to influence a firm’s
performance are: policies and standards, risk assessment and management, security training/
education/awareness, physical security, regulatory compliance, insurance for cyber security and
security personnel. The IT-related security investment factors are: network security, platform
security, application security, mass storage security, file and data security, response to security
attack/breach and mobile security.
2. For further reading, see, for instance, Gordon et al. (2011), Spanos and Angelis (2016) and
Berkman, Jona, Lee and Soderstrom (2018).
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